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The Mekong River bears to Southeast Asia much the same relationship
which the great Mississippi bears to the central states of America, the
Indus to the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, and it is to the interior of South-
east Asia what the Danube is to the east of Europe. It is the eighth longest
river in the world, having a length of 4,200 kilometers.
The Mekong rises in Tibet, flows generally in a southerly direction along
the mountain ranges in China, and then forms the boundary between
Burma and Laos as well as between Thailand and Laos. It again continues
its southerly direction, flows through Cambodia and South Vietnam and
finally discharges into the South China Sea near Saigon.
The Lower Mekong referred to in the present study is the river from the
Burma border to the sea, flowing through or separating the territories of
Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and the Republic of South Vietnam. It has a
length of 2,400 kilometers and drains an area of about 609,000 square
kilometers.'
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The significance of the Mekong River to that states which share in it led,
over a century ago, to the conclusion of international agreements beginning
with the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between France
and Siam (Thailand) on August 15, 1856.2 But concerted efforts for devel-
opment of the river in its lower reaches were undertaken only after the
establishment of the Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the
Lower Mekong Basin (The Mekong Committee) in 1957 under the aus-
pices of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).
Since then the entire outlook and motive force of development have
undergone a radical change; in addition to the basin states, twenty-six
countries outside the basin, 3 seventeen United Nations agencies, 4 four
foundations, 5 and a number of private organizations 6 have shown consid-
erable interest and have actively colloborated in the development activities
by offering technical and financial assistance by way of grants and soft
loans.
Under the terms of its statute, the functions of the Mekong Committee
are primarily preparatory in nature, and consist in assembling information,
clarifying issues, considering and defining alternative objectives of planning
and making suggestions for the promotion of international cooperation with
regard to the development of the basin. The statutory functions are promo-
tion, coordination, supervision and control of the planning and in-
vestigation of water resources development projects in the basin. 7
To perform these functions, the powers assigned to the Committee
include the authority to (i) propose to the governments of the basin states
plans for studies and research; (ii) submit work programmes to those
governments for consideration; (iii) approach the United Nations, special-
2For the treaty see 47 BRITISH AND F-OREIGN STATE PAPERS (1856- 1857) p. 993.
3Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Republic of China, Denmark, Finland, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom, United Arab Republic and the United States.4 Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations, United Nations Development Programme,
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, International Labour Organization, International Telecommunications Union,
International Atomic Energy Agency, United Nations Children's Fund, Food and Agricul-
tural Organization, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, United
Nations Industrial Development Organization, World Food Programme, World Health Or-
ganization, World Meteorological Organization, Asian Development Bank, Asian Institute for
Economic Development and Planning, and Asian Highway Transport.5 Asia Foundation, Ford Foundation, Ramon Magasaysay Foundation, and Rockefeller
Foundation.6For example, Resources for the Future, Inc., Society of Friends (London), Bulgur
Associates Inc., Gestetner (Eastern) Ltd., Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd., Nippon Electric
Co., Price Waterhouse Co., Shell Oil Co., and Sycip, Gorres, Velaya & Co., University of the
Philippines.7See, Statute of the Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong
Basin, art. 4.
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ized agencies, national and international organizations for technical and
financial assistance; (iv) take title to such property as may be offered by the
United Nations and other organizations; and (v) submit criteria for the use
of water of the main river for the purpose of water resources development.8
As the name9 indicates, the Mekong Committee was constituted for
carrying out the most comprehensive investigation and planning activities
of the basin resources in a systematic and corrdinated fashion. Since these
functions are now mostly achieved, the next important stage in the devel-
opment process is the operational activities. This stage is replete with legal
and administrative problems. Quite often they produce bottlenecks pre-
venting whole-sale development action. These problems appear and recur
throughout the entire process of construction, operation and maintenance
of the projects.
The form and structure of the agency responsible for construction,
operation and maintenance of water resources development programmes
has been the subject of considerable discussion and experience, even
before the beginning of the present era of international basin development.
Most of the literature on the subject, however, deals with river basin
administration within a given country. Analysis of the special problems of
law and administration associated with the development of water resources
in an international context proves them to be rather limited.' 0
As the administrative problems are day-to-day problems, it has been
found expedient to establish an institutional agency to deal with the various
issues which arise from time to time. To be effective, the agency should
8 1d.
9The Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin.
lUA. H. GA-RRETSON, R. D. HAYTON and C. J. OLMSTEAD, THE LAW OF IN-
TERNATIONAL DRAINAGE BASINS (New York: Oceana, 1967); J. D. Chapman (ed.) The
International River Basin (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1963); United Na-
tions, Integrated Utilization of Water Resources (Fergana: 1966); International Association
of Water Law, Annales Juris Aquarum (Mendoza: 1968): HERMAN FINER, THE TVA.
LESSONS FOR INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION (Montreal: International Labour Office, 1944);
V. V. Zvonkov, Integrated Water Resources Development in the River Basins, USSR
(Moscow: 1957); L. M. BLOOMFIELD AND G. F. FITZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATER PROBLEMS
OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (Toronto: the Carswell Company Ltd., 1958); R. R.
BAXTER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS (Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1964) pp. 96- 148; Louis B. Wehle, International Administration of European Water-
ways, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. (1946) pp. 100- 120: W. E. Kenworthy, Joint Development of
International Waters, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. (1960) pp. 592-601; I. K. Fox and L. Craine,
Organizational Arrangements for Water and Water Development, 2 NAT. RESOURCES J.
(April 1962) pp. 1-44; Albert Lepawsky, International Development of River Resources, 39
INT'L AFFAIRS (1963) p. 534; United Nations, Systems of Administrative Organization for
the Integrated Development of River Basins: Outline of the Different Types of Institutional
Structure Used in Latin America and the Rest of the World. Doc. E/CN. 12/503 (1959);
Organization for Planning, Construction and Operation of River Valley Projects Doc.
E/CN. I I/WRD/CONF.4/L. I (1960).
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have sufficient authority, technical capability, and financing capacity, so
that an international programme for the basin as a whole can be conducted
on a continuing basis. The creation, composition, and role of such an
agency varies from case to case. The functions of the agency vary in
accordance with the physical characteristics of the basin and with, among
others, the political, economic, social, and traditional environments of the
basin states involved.
No model form has yet been established. Nonetheless it is advantageous
to ascertain the accumulated rich experiences of many countries, in
different parts of the world, where international development of water
resources have been initiated with varying degrees of success. Drawing
upon the experiences of other river organizations to the extent that they
are relevant, and leaning on the discussions that have already taken place
on the subject, l ' an attempt will be made in this paper to present proposals
for the establishment of an International Authority for the administration
of the Lower Mekong development projects. Basic legal considerations of
such an Authority, its functions and powers, and possible participation of
the United Nations will be examined.
Basic Legal Considerations
The Establishment of a Lower Mekong Development Authority
The functions of the present Mekong Committee are promotional, and
mostly technical, in nature. They relate to fact finding, investigation, co-
ordination and planning of water resources development. The Committee
was not intended, at least when it was constituted, to undertake wider
administrative functions. If it were to do so, the Statute of the Committee
would require substantial modification. 12 The Committee may have to be
reconstituted, and may have to be given a more formal character. Alterna-
tively, a new Authority should be established by concluding a new treaty.
It is without much legal significance whether the Authority established
for administration is a new one or a modified Mekong Committee. What is
"Proceedings and Papers presented at (i) Mekong Committee Seminar on Legal and
Administrative Aspects of Lower Mekong Development with special reference to initial
Mainstream Projects, Bangkok, 25-29 August 1969, and (ii) Carnegie-Harvard Seminar on
International Law for Legal Officers, Harvard University Law School. August 22-September
17, 1966 (unpublished).12 Emphasizing the necessity of a strengthened international agency for administration of
the Mekong development project, Gilbert White and associates point out that "there is no
precedent for the type and scope of international administration which will be required. An
innovation will be in order." See Gilbert F. White, Egbert de Vries, Harold B. Dunkerley and
John V. Krutilla, Economic and Social Aspects of Lower Mekong Development (Washington:
July 1962) pp. 75-76.
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important is the legal power of the Authority, and the way in which it is
designed to bring the basin states together into clear association, and to
achieve the integrated development of projects to produce maximum ben-
efits for all the countries concerned. Integrated development envisions the
merger of component parts in a greater whole; it presupposes constitutional
links of a federal character.
The Authority responsible for administration must be a permanent or-
gan. This gives it "a continuing existence and power to anticipate and
adapt to the dynamic and changing aspects of river development.' 3 The
traditional practice of occasional diplomatic negotiations or conferences
will not satisfy the requirements of integrated development, wherein there
is a clear need for coactivity and not mere coexistence. In other words, the
problem is not how to keep the basin states peacefully apart, but how to
bring them together.
Ideally, a supranational Authority should be created with broad powers
of a sovereign nature. The basic purpose of the Authority would be to seek
comprehensive development of the water resources for the benefit of all the
people of the basin without distinction as to nationality or politics. Under
the existing conditions in the Mekong region, it is presumptuous to envis-
age the establishment of such a-strong supranational Mekong Development
Authority.
For the present, it may be practicable to tackle the problem in a lower
key, that is to plan for a much lower level of integration. 14 Provision may
however be made for more effective arrangements in the future when
conditions conducive to favourable change take place in the political arena.
The institutional devices may therefore be planned to meet the minimum
requirements of an integrated plan of development.
Between the two extremes of supranational and purely intergovern-
mental systems, a middle path which does not entail a fresh transfer
of sovereignty may be chosen. There may be nothing incompatible in tak-
ing such a step. It may be possible for the basin states to create an entity
possessing objective international personality, and to entrust it, as re-
gards themselves, with the exercise of certain powers normally exercised
in relation to states, by national governments. Stated otherwise, the Au-
thority would neither be a supra-governmental body with power of direc-
tion over national governments, nor an extra-governmantal body with pow-
er merely to make recommendations to basin states. However, a joint
decision once reached would be a decision which would bind t oe members.
"aGARRESTON et al., supra, n. 10 at 137.
14See Carnegie-Harvard Seminar on International Law for Legal Officers, supra n. 1I.
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AIMS AND PURPOSES
The aims and purposes of the Authority should be defined in the con-
stitutive instrument in such a way that there would be possible scope for
future development in accordance with the changing pattern of politico-
economic life of the basin states and with unforeseen conditions. Broad-
ly, the purpose should be promotion, coordination, supervision, execution
and administration of the comprehensive development of the basin.
The actual initiation of specific projects, their construction, operation,
and maintenance should be reviewed and approved by the Authority.
Detailed rules in regard to those projects could be defined through the
traditional techniques of bilateral or multilateral agreements as the case
may be. This will not involve surrender of national sovereignty, and will
ensure a reasonable degree of independence in regard to the judicious
exploitation of the resources of the basin.
In order to achieve its purposes, the Authority should forge new links
between the basin countries for a long period of time, say for example, fifty
years. In doing so, it should not reduce the links with other countries. In
fact, the Authority should aim at associating with other countries, and
especially with the United Nations and its specialized agencies.
MEMBERSHIP
Alternatively, the Authority could be composed of designees from (I)
the basin states alone, (2) basin states together with interested third states,
(3) basin states and representatives of the United Nations, or (4) a com-
bination of (2) and (3).15
BASIN STATES ALONE
For the immediate future, there is little prospect of participation by the
upper basin states-the Peoples' Republic of China, Burma, and the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam-in the Mekong development pro-
gramme. However, in consideration of the large drainage area lying in the
upper reaches of the river, doors may be kept open for admission of these
states by unamimous decision of the members already represented. For the
present, the basin states represented in the Authority will be the same
states who were the original members of the Mekong Committee.
BASIN STATES TOGETHER WITH THIRD STATES
At a time when navigation was the predominant use of international
rivers, powerful third states showed a tendency to demand in-
ternationalization of the rivers, and participation in the administrative ma-
15See United Nations, The International Administration of the Mainstream Dam, Doc.
WRD/MKG/INF/L. 171/Add. I (September 30, 1966).
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chinery in order to protect their commercial interests. 16 New multiple uses,
such as industrial and agricultural purposes and generation of hydroelectric
power are, however, of interest only to bordering riparian states. Never-
theless, it is obvious that the Mekong has to attract large financial in-
vestment from external sources. This would normally call for the participa-
tion of aid-giving countries, either as observers or associate members in the
Authority.
BASIN STATES TOGETHER WITH UNITED NATIONS
Participation of the United Nations in the Authority may be helpful in
maintaining stability in the area. The possible role of the United Nations in
the newly constituted Authority will be discussed elsewhere.
17
THE INSTITUTIONS
Broadly, water resources development administration entails political,
technical and organizational elements. To deal with these elements, it is
necessary to set up an institutional machinery which will make use of the
agencies and facilities already in operation. The proposed Authority should
have three principal organs:' 8 (1) a Council of Basin States; (2) a Per-
manent Technical Board; and (3) a Secretariat. In addition to these, vari-
ous subsidiary organs of differing types might gradually develop to carry
out specific projects and assignments.
1. The Council of Basin States
In order to administer the programmes effectively, the Authority must
be able to make decisions affecting matters of policy. It is therefore in-
dispensable to endow it with powers that would ensure maximum political
authority to set priorities, to determine when investigations should be
made, and which projects should be approved and carried out. A Council
of representatives of basin states should be established for that purpose.
The proposed Council of Basin States would be the supreme organ with
principal decision-making powers. Essentially, it should be a political organ
and composed of senior political respresentatives, as for example Foreign
Ministers. The presence of a United Nations representative as a neutral
Chairman of the Council would be highly advisable in order to facilitate
agreements.
16As late as 1945 President Truman proposed that the United States, Great Britain, the
Soviet Union and France should participate in the administration of European waterways in
addition to the bordering riparian states. As cited in Louis B. Wehle, International Adminis-
tration of European Inland Waterways, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. (1946) p. 101.
17See infra.
"
8See Carnegie-Harvard Seminar on International Law for Legal Officers, supra n. I
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The Council would be primarily responsible for assuring the fulfillment
of the organization's purposes. Decisions on substantive matters would
continue to be adopted unanimously as is the case in the present Mekong
Committee. The unanimity requirement for substantive matters would as-
sure the contracting states that there would be no abridgement of sover-
eignty without their individual consent. This provision need not necessarily
bar progress. Joint action can be taken to the extent that the governments
can agree and are motivated by goodwill and understanding.
2. The Permanent Technical Board
In order to carry forward the development programme, it would be
necessary to have the collaboration of technical personnel to direct plan-
ning and to propose construction and operation of the projects. This can be
achieved in two ways: (1) by creating a separate organ, or (2) by assigning
the function to the Council, which is the political organ. As the tasks of the
Authority will be increasing continually, it appears that a single organ is
not sufficient to ensure the proper management of both political and techni-
cal functions. A separate organ, the Permanent Technical Board, is there-
fore proposed. This body would replace the present Advisory Board which
is composed of non-riparian members.
The proposed Permanent Technical Board should be composed of an
equal number of representatives of the basin states of a lower status from a
political point of view, but who can devote more of their time than those of
higher ranking officials in the Council. The members should represent
various fields including engineering, law and economics, so that they are
competent on the specific matters under discussion. Representatives of
various fields may not however increase the numerical strength to the
extent of jeopardizing its efficiency.
The members of the Permanent Technical Board should exercise their
functions in complete independence and should neither solicit nor accept
instructions from their governments or any organization. The role of the
Board, as a function-oriented collective enterprise, should be to represent
the common interest of the basin community rather than the individual
national interests.
The main functions of the Board would be to make proposals on engi-
neering and technical aspects of the development programme.
3. The Secretariat
The Authority should have a secretariat headed by an Executive Secre-
tary. The Executive Secretary should be assisted in his duties by such staff
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as the Council might determine. The conditions of employment of the staff
should be defined in the Staff Regulations.
The Executive Secretary should be appointed by the Council from
among the candidates proposed by the basin states. His functions and
powers should be defined by the Council. He should be responsible to the
Council.
In effect, the present Executive Agent fulfils the functions of the Execu-
tive Secretary. This arrangement has been successful and may therefore be
continued without substantial modification.
Legal Capacity of the Authority
To enable it to fulfil its functions, the Authority must have a defined
status, privileges and immunities. It must be as strong and as efficient as
possible, it must be endowed with specific capacity to exercise functions,
and undertake rights and obligations on a parity with similar functions,
rights and obligations exercised or possessed by the individual basin states.
The importance of conferring predictable legal status on the Authority
cannot be overemphasized. This is not without historical precedents. For
example, the members and personnel of the European Danube Commis-
sion were accorded diplomatic prerogatives by international agreements.
Article 53 of the Treaty of Berlin of July 13, 1878 provided that the
Commission should exercise its functions in "complete independence of
the territorial authority," a provision which was confirmed in the Definitive
Statute of the Danube of July 23, 1921. The capacity of the Commission
may be summarized as follows:
The European Danube Commission was an international administrative
organ of the collegiate type, a composite organ; it has wide competence,
exceeding that of most other international administrative organs. It has legis-
lative competence, judicial functions in civil and criminal cases, in the first
and second instance, taxing power, its own flag; it was not restricted to
informational and ministerial functions or, like other river commissions, to
preparatory, supervisory mediation functions; it not only coordinated activi-
ties of the member states, but replaced national administrations, in full in-
dependence from territorial authority; its legislative acts were directly binding
upon individuals. 19
The International Commission of the Congo instituted by the General
Act of the Berlin Conference of 1885 was independent of the riparian
governments. 20 In recent years, the Joint Syro-Jordanian Commission es-
1 Josef L. Kunz, The Danube Regime and the Belgrade Conference, 43 AM. J. INT'L L.
(1949) p. 105.20The International Commission of the Congo which might have served as a unique body
of supranational features has however never come into being. The signatory powers were
unable to set up such an organization. See T. 0. Elias, The Berlin Treaty and the River Niger
Commission, 57 AM. J. INT'L L.(1963), pp. 877-878.
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tablished under the 1953 Agreement between Syria and Jordan under the
'Yarmuk Scheme' is a body corporate possessing a wide range of powers in
regard to the operation and maintenance of the Maqarin hydroelectric
power project.21
The proposed Authority should possess full legal personality, as recog-
nized in both international and municipal law, and in particular the capacity
(i) to acquire and dispose of property, (ii) to enter into contracts and
agreements, and (iii) to institute legal proceedings.
LEGAL PERSONALITY
By virtue of its international legal personality, the Authority can con-
clude agreements governed by international law with all states as well as
other international organizations. Its legal capcity under municipal law is
equally important. By means of the legal personality expressly conferred
on it, the Authority can enter into innumerable transactions which are
incidental to its day-to-day operations such as, for instance, transactions
dealing with the purchase of supplies and equipment, lease of premises,
employment of personnel, etc. When legal personality is not conferred, it
may perhaps be the national law of each state which determines the extent
to which the Authority shall enjoy legal capacity. National laws may vary
considerably.
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
The Authority should also enjoy privileges and immunities as are neces-
sary for the efficient performance of its functions. Generally speaking, the
term "privileges and immunities" implies all that could be considered
necessary to the realization of the purposes of the Authority, to the free
functioning of its organs, and to the independent exercise of the functions
and duties of its officials.
For example, the property and assets of the Authority should enjoy
immunity from legal process, unless by contract the Authority waives its
immunity for the purpose of any proceedings. Its property should be free
from restrictions, regulations, controls and moratoriums of any nature to
the extent necessary to carry out its operations. Officers and employees of
the Authority should be immune from legal processes with respect to acts
performed by them in their official capacity and should be accorded special
privileges of immigration, travel and feedom from alien registration. They
should also be immune from taxation and customs duties.
21See, Agreement between the Republic of Syria and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
concerning the Utilization of the Yarmuk Waters, June 4, 1953; art. 10, 2, in United
Nations, Legislative Texts and Treaty Provisions concerning the Utilization of International
Rivers for Other Purposes Then Navigation, Doe. ST/LEG/SER.B/12 (1963) p. 382.
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Happily, a considerable body of law concerned with the privileges and
immunities of international organizations has been developed. 22 The Gen-
eral Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,
adopted by the General Assembly in 1946,23 or the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies adopted in 1947,24
could very well serve as a model for the present case.
LEGAL PROCEEDINGS
For the exercise of its functions, the Authority should possess the right
on its own account to institute legal proceedings, necessary for the protec-
tion of its interests and, whether it occupies the position of plaintiff or
defendent, to enter into desirable settlements. Further, the ability of the
Authority to enter into firm commitments would be dependent on the
applicability to it of the ordinary legal procedures, which private business-
men follow in their contractual and other relations.
RELATIONSHIP WITH THIRD STATES AND ORGANIZATIONS
External assistance and the cooperation of other states are indispensable
for the effective implementation of the Mekong development programme. 25
The Authority will at all times be concerned to develop its legal and
political positions in dealing with non-member states and international
organizations. In particular, technological programmes will increase the
need for these arrangements.
The relationship of the Authority to ECAFE is of special importance.
The Mekong Committee was born under the auspices of ECAFE, and
much of its present activities is carried out with the assistance and direc-
tion of that Organization. There is almost daily contact at all levels be-
tween the Mekong secretariat and ECAFE, which has led up to important
policy decisions. This arrangement has worked well and for every reason it
is essential that the Authority should continue that relationship.
22See D. W. BoWETT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS (New York: Fred-
erick A. Praeger, 1963) pp. 281- 295.
231 United Nations Treaty Series (1946- 1947) No. 4, p. 16.
2433 United Nations Treaty Series (1949) No. 52 1, p. 262.
25Perhaps the most immediate need for the establishment of the present Mekong Com-
mittee in 1957 and certainly its most important function is "to receive and adminis-
ter .... financial and technical assistance." No matter how strong the determination, per-
severance of the basin states, and the effectiveness of the 'Mekong spirit', any acceptable
basin development programme requires millions of dollars and is far beyond the financial or
technical capabilities of the basin states themselves. Acting independently, they do not have
the creditworthiness to obtain the necessary long-term development financing on reasonable
terms. On the other hand, acting jointly through a regional organization, their borrowing
capacity is enormously strengthened. See P. K. Menon, The Mekong River and International
Development of Natural Resources 5 INT'L LAW. (197 1) pp. 53- 58.
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Voting Procedure in the Council of Basin States and the
Permanent Technical Board
Voting is the ultimate means by which decisions are reached. The shift
of real decision-making power to the Authority will place a strain on the
principle of sovereignty and equality. The voting procedure should there-
fore be set up in such a way as to provide a respresentative decision on
important issues and, at the same time, not to prejudice the political
sensitivity of the sovereign states.
Broadly there are two ways by which voting procedure could be set up:
(I) equality of voting, and (2) weighted voting. 26 In the case of weighted
voting, a specific number of votes is assigned to member states on the basis
of predetermined criteria. For example, some of the relevant criteria that
can be employed are population, drainage area, length of the river, volume
of water, national wealth, financial contribution to the development pro-
gramme, etc. Weighting could be based on these factors individually or on
a mathematical formula based on a combination of two or more of the
factors.
In an Authority based on the principle of sovereign equality, the weight-
ed voting does not appear to be very persuasive. It may be somewhat
unrealistic to equate, for voting purposes, the kingdom of Laos with a
population of less than three million inhabitants, with Thailand having a
population of more than thrity million.27 However, the only acceptable
solution seems to be to maintain the equality of voting, that is one state one
vote, as is the case now.
In the proposed Authority, decisions should be made by the Council on
the proposals of the Permanent Technical Board. The Board's proposals
would be recommendatory in nature and as such its resolutions should be
adopted by a simple majority, that is at least three of the four states. On the
other hand, the Council's decisions should be by a unanimous vote of the
basin states as they will be binding on them. This is necessary in order to
respect the national sovereignty and to protect the legitimate interests of
the basin states.
At the same time, it is well to remeber that, if the Council is to function
26See Elizabeth McIntyre, Weighted Voting in International Organizations, 8 INT'L ORG.
(1954), pp. 484-497: Herbert Weinschel, The Doctrine of the Equality of States and Its
Recent Modifications, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. (1951), pp. 417-442: Louis B. Sogn, Multiple
Representation in International Assemblies, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. (1946) pp. 71-99; and
Weighting of Votes in an International Assembly 38 AM. POL. SCI. REV. (1944) pp.
1198- 1203.
27According to estimates, the population of Laos is 2,893,000 and of Thailand is
34,738,000. See United Nations, Demographic Yearbook 1969 (70.XIII.l) (New York: 1970)
pp. 138- 139.
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effectively under the unanimity principle, ways and means will have to be
found of minimizing differences and facilitating agreements. The unanimity
principle will require an 'honest and good faith' effort on the part of the
members to reconcile and reduce their differences to a minimum. This
spirit of understanding and tolerance will make action possible on the
proposals of the Permanent Technical Board even without the need of a
formal vote in the Council. The effectiveness of the procedure will be
greatly dependent on the ability and skill of the Chairman.
Settlement of Disputes
The present Mekong Committee Statute does not contain any provision
for the settlement of disputes. It will however be necessary for the in-
strument constituting the Authority to provide for a specific mode of
settling differences and disputes, which may arise between or among the
basin states.
The traditional means of settling disputes are through good offices,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration or adjudication. The Montevideo Dec-
laration 28 adopted by the Seventh Inter-American Conference and the
Helsinki Rules 29 adopted by the International Law Association provide
detailed guidelines for instituting machinery in case of disputes between
states as to their legal rights or other interests.
As the water resources development presents complex sensitive ques-
tions, mutual accommodation and agreement should be the medium of
settlement of disputes instead of invocation of an adjudicatory power.3 0 As
the Rau Commission has ably stated in the dispute between Sind and
Punjab, concerning the waters of the Indus River basin in 1941, "The most
satisfactory settlement of dispute ... is by agreement, the parties adopting
the same technical solution of each problem as if they were a single unified
community undivided by political or administrative frontiers." 3 '
Closely following the Helsinki Rules, it is proposed that when the
Council of Basin States is unable to reach an agreement, it should report
the matter to the member countries, who should try to settle it by negotia-
2 8See, Declaration of Montevideo concerning the Industrial and Agricultural Use of
International Rivers, December 24, 1933, Articles 9, 10 in United Nations, Legal Problems
relating to the Utilization and Use of International Rivers, Annex I (Doc. A/5409) (April,
1963).
29See, International Law Association, HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, arts. 26-37. HELSINKI RULES also provide an annex containing
model rules for the Constitution of the Conciliation Commission for the settlement of a
dispute.
3OSee Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 392 (1963).31As quoted in John G. Laylin and Rinaldo L. Bianchi, The Role of Adjudication in
International River Disputes, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. (1959) pp. 32-33.
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tion and mutual agreement. If, after the lapse of a reasonable period of
time, say three to six months, this procedure proves unavailing, the ques-
tion should be referred to a conciliation commission (failing which to an
arbitral tribunal) composed equally of lawyers and experts. The commis-
sion should be constituted by agreement among the states or, if they fail to
agree, by nomination by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Functions and Powers of the Authority
The Authority is an instrumentality of the four basin states. Its activities
would be limited to those which are specifically permitted in the con-
stituent instrument, and to those which could reasonably be implied from
such permission. In order to calm any national sensitiveness, it would be
necessary to include in the amended Statute of the Mekong Committee, or
in the new treaty of the Authority, clear, defined and soberly constructed
provisions concerning functions and powers with sufficient vision to bring
about, or to conform to, the changes required to guide future activities. The
Authority should have at its disposal effective means of decision-making
and an efficient system of control which will ensure that the project is
carried out as anticipated or can be adapted to new conditions. The follow-
ing are considered to be some of the important functions of the Authority;
they are intended to be merely suggestive rather than exhaustive.
Supervisory and Regulatory Functions
Supervisory and regulatory functions include investigation and planning
of joint water resources development either on the Authority's own in-
itiative or by reference from the participating governments of ECAFE. As
the Authority may not be maintaining a large corps of specialized person-
nel, the investigation studies may be carried out by the national agencies
singly or jointly, or by acquiring the services of foreign consulting firms, or
international organizations like the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, under the general direction and control of the Authority.
By taking consideration the Permanent Technical Board's recommenda-
tions and practical possibilities for multi-purpose development, planning
objectives should be defined and projects selected for social and economic
development of the region as a whole.
The Authority should have the power (i) to draft rules and procedures
for investigation, (ii) to select projects, and (iii) to establish design criteria
and methodology of selected projects. Project design is so important that in
several cases international river commissions have been responsible for
establishing it. For example, in the case of the St. Lawrence River Power
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Project, project designs were drawn up by a Joint Board of Engineers
created by the riparian governments.3 2 Similarly, in the Colorado Basin,
projects were designed jointly by the International Boundary and Water
Commission. 33 In the case of the Aswan Dam project in the Nile Basin,
the Permanent Joint Technical Committee was entrusted with project plan-
ning and design. 34
Executive Functions
The Authority would not only undertake planning and investigation but
also execute the projects without interference. Execution includes con-
struction, operation, maintenance and administration of the projects. This
is not to say that the Authority itself would implement the projects but to
suggest that it would be responsible for their operational and administrative
aspects. The projects should be carried out under its supervision and
control. The regime of the Maritime Danube Commission represents a
precedent for a power centralized executive authority. 35 The adminis-
tration of the New York Port Authority 36 and the Tennessee Valley
Authority are other relevant examples. 37
The Authority should have the power to determine and administer
proper apportionment of cost and benefits concerning projects serving two
or more states. Its power should also extend to formulating rules and
regulations as to distribution and use of surplus benefits, such as the use of
excess electricity and irrigation waters, facilities of navigation, fisheries,
etc.
Financial Functions
The Authority must be given complete control over its financial re-
sources. It should be able to draft its own financial rules and procedures,
and should have more independence than that generally given to national
32 See, Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement between the United States of
America and Canada relating to the Establishment of the St. Lawrence River Joint Board of
Engineers, November 12, 1953 in United Nations, supra n. 21 at 199- 200.
3 See, Treaty between the United States of America and Mexico relating to the Utili-
zation of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande from Fort
Quitman to the Gulf of Mexico, November 14, 1944, art. 13, in United Nations, id., p. 246.
34See, Agreement between the United Arab Republic and the Republic of Sudan for the
Full Utilization of the Nile Waters, Part IV, in United Nations, id., pp. 145- 146.
"See Josef L. Kunz, supra, n. 19.3 6See FREDERICK L. BIRD, A STUDY OF THE PORT OF NEW YORK AUTHORITY (New
York: Dunn & Bradstreet, Inc., 1949).37 ROscoE C. MARTIN, TVA: THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS (The University of Alabama
Press and the University of Tennessee Press, 1956).
International Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 4
The Lower Mekong River Basin
agencies. The present provision in the Mekong Statute in regard to power
to "make requests on behalf of the participating governments for special
financial and technical assistance and receive and administer ... assis-
tance3 8 should be strengthened.
The Council should establish audit procedures to ensure the legality of
the transactions and the economy and efficiency of the actions taken by the
Authority and its agencies. Audit is one of the most essential means of
control over the financial transactions, and it should be carried out by an
independent extended body. The Council should appoint a board of audi-
tors consisting of the Auditor-General or corresponding officer of the
member states. The accounts should be approved and certified by the
Executive Secretary and submitted annually to the board of auditors on or
before a specified date. The board of auditors should report to the Council
on matters including the accuracy of the accounts and records, cases of
fraud, wasteful or improper expenditure of the Authority's money or as-
sets, and any defect in the accounting system.
Large-scale construction calls for substantial amounts of capital and the
Lower Mekong states have already confronted difficulties in obtaining the
necessary funds. A distinct element of these difficulties is that financiers in
other parts of the world are uncertain as to the future stability of the
Mekong states on account of what appears to be a marked degree of
misunderstanding and friction among them, due to political and ideological
differences. 3 9 If the development is entrusted to a business-like autono-
mous authority free from national political control, it will tend to allay the
misgivings of those who have capital to lend.
Legislative Functions
The Authority should assume responsibilities in formulating devel-
opment policies to achieve the overall objectives of efficient water re-
sources management. These policy decisions require consideration of vari-
ous aspects of planning and include the problems relating to economic
feasibility, evaluation and justification of projects in order to establish
38Statute of the Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong
Basin, art. 4(b).
39For instance, the United States, pursuant to former President Lyndon B. Johnson's
Baltimore proposal of $1 billion into Asian development, investigated the Prek Thnot project
in Cambodia in 1966. Later that year, the United States Congress "amended the foreign aid
law to bar American aid to nations that traded with or helped North Vietnam." Cambodia was
charged with supplying food and being a sanctuary to North Vietnamese troops and the
Vietcong along its border with South Vietnam. Following this, the United States formally
withdrew its aid to the Prek Thnot project which is primarily a Cambodian dam. See Peter
Braestup, Shift by Sihanouk on Dam Reported: Hostility to Mekong Project by Cambodia
Said to End, New York Times (July 24, 1967) p. 7.
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standards and procedures, financing and reimbursement policy, manpower
availability, and criteria for allocating water for different purposes. Legisla-
tion is the means to implement and enforce all these policy decisions.
There are numerous instances where international river commissions are
vested with certain legislative powers. The European Commission for the
Danube was empowered to draw up rules and regulations for navigation
and the policing of the waterway. The legislative role of the International
Boundary and Water Commission between the United States and Mexico
relates to the investigations and development of detailed plans for the
construction of works, including the division of costs between the two
governments. The so-called advisory powers of many commissions are in
fact legislative in nature, even though final decisions are left to the con-
tracting states concerned.
Judicial Functions
The Council of the Authority should have judicial powers to resolve
problems and disputes arising out of the interpretation of its own treaties
and agreements. The decision of the Council in these respects should be
final and binding upon the basin states and upon individuals in the basin.
When differences on these matters arise within the Authority itself, they
should be referred to the governments for reaching agreements through
diplomatic negotiations.
For example, the International Joint Commission between the United
States and Canada exercise judicial and arbitral functions. In its judicial
capacity, the Commission should examine and report to the governments
concerned upon questions or matters of difference arising between the two
nations involving their rights, obligations or interests along the common
boundary.40 The Commission may also act as an arbitral commission
whenever a question is referred to it for decision by the consent of both
governments. 41
Participation of the United Nations
As contrasted with the League of Nations, which did not envisage any
direct action aimed at economic development or social welfare per se, the
United Nations Charter pledges member states to take "joint and separate
action in cooperation with the Organization" 42 for the promotion of "higher
4
"See Treaty between Great Britain and the United States relating to Boundary Waters,
and Questions arising between the United States and Canada, January II, 1909, art. IX, in
United Nations, supra, n. 21 at 260-266.411d., art. X.42Charter of the United Nations, art. 56.
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standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic and social
progress and development" 43 as well as for "solutions of international,
economic, social, health and related problems." 44 Since its inception, the
United Nations has been active in fostering political and economic cooper-
ation among countries for water resources development. 45
This effort has been facilitated not only because of the primacy of the
United Nations in its political role of bringing together the basin states
sharing an international river, but also because of the Organization's com-
petence in the economic sphere, for initiating multi-purpose development in
diverse areas such as generation of hydroelectricity, promotion of naviga-
tion, flood control, irrigation improvement as well as the social aspects of
economic development, public administration etc.
Within the provisions of articles 55, 57, 59, 60 and 63 under chapters IX
and X of its Charter, the United Nations may give encouragement to the
formation of the Lower Mekong Development Authority. The United
Nations can recommend to the basin states courses of action for estab-
lishing the Authority; but it cannot compel any of the states to follow its
recommendations. It has the power only to exercise initiatives and to make
recommendations to member states. In the case of regional cooperation,
the consent and support of all governments concerned are necessary.
The Authority can only be established with the mutual recognition and
express consent of the states. The fact that the Authority cannot be
established without the consent of the states directly interested does not
however preclude the United Nations, acting in the first instance, from
suggesting to the states that they consider its creation in order to protect
and promote their own interests. The United Nations might best seek to
arouse interest in the idea of such an Authority and facilitate the task of
governments, in creating it by provoking thought and providing advisory
services.
Any relationship between the Authority and the United Nations could
be determined only by an agreement between the basin states and the
United Nations. The agreement would have to be purely a voluntary one.
The scope and nature of the relationship should be clearly defined in the
agreement.
43id., art. 55, (a).
441d., art. 55, (b).
4See United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 29th Sess.,
Special Supplement (E/33 19): id., 33rd Sess., Special Supp.; id., 35th Sess., Special Supp.
(E/3587): id., 37th Sess., No. 13 (E/388 ): id., 40th Sess. Supp. No. 3 (E/4138): id., 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 3 (E/4447); id.; Triennial Report on Water Resources Development
(ST/ECA/ 143).
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The United Nations might participate in the proposed Authority in
several ways, including the following: 4q
I. The United Nations might provide staff and other expert services
through the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East as has been
done heretofore. It might also provide additional executive and adminis-
trative staff under the OPEX programme. 47
2. The United Nations might continue to provide technical assistance
by way of pre-investment investigation and training projects, and supply
equipment within the limits of the type of activities envisaged in the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Special Fund sector. 48 These
pre-investment investigations play a catalytic role in development. 49 This
would require a request from the governments concerned 50 to the Adminis-
46See United Nations, supra, n. 15; see also The Question of United Nations Participa-
tion in Institutional Arrangements for the Administration of Mekong Mainstream Projects,
Memorandum by the Office of Legal Affairs of United Nations presented at the Mekong
Committee Seminar on Legal and Adminstrative Aspects of Lower Mekong Development
with Special Reference to Initial Mainstream Projects, Bangkok, 25-29 August 1969.47 OPEX programme, originally authorized by the General Assembly resolution 1256
(XIII) of 14 November 1958, is for the provision of operational, executive and administrative
personnel to the requesting states. These personnel are appointed as officials of the Govern-
ments being assisted and not as advisers to those Governments, even though they remain in
the employment of the United Nations. See United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations
1967 (New York: 1969) p. 302.48The United Nations Special Fund is not a lending agency but is rather a programme
which provides experts, fellowships, equipment, material and special services unavailable in
recipient countries but essential to the achievement of a project purpose. It finances
pre-investment surveys, feasibility studies and the establishment of research and training
facilities, that are required to encourage the subsequent provision of public or private capital
for development. See Paul G. Hoffman, Operation Breakthrough 38 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(October 1959) p. 40.49The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) assistance is specially impor-
tant because it requires an active and continuing collaboration among the basin states, the
UNDP and the United Nations family of organizations as executing agencies. This collabora-
tion responds to the need for economy and to the nature of development itself which requires
a carefully planned combination of activities of various agencies specialized in different fields.
For the implementation of UNDP assistance programme three different kinds of agreements
are concluded: (I) basic agreements between UNDP and the individual basin states; (2)
agreements between UNDP and executing agencies; and (3) an agreed plan of operation
between UNDP, basin state or states, and an executing agency.
5 With regard to projects lying within the basin, the UNDP (Special Fund) has preferred
that such requests be reviewed by the Mekong Committee in the first instance. In this context,
the Special Fund is cited to have said: "In some cases, the Committee might then unani-
mously wish to present the original project in the wider scope of a basin-wide project. In other
cases the Committee would be able to inform the Fund that an individual country project,
although concerning only the country in question, was an integrated part of the general task of
developing the Mekong basin, in such a case the individual country would then itself submit
the application to the Fund, but the application would be strengthened by the Committee's
endorsement which it then would have. A review by the Committee could only benefit all
concerned, including the individual countries in question, concerning those aspects of the
request relating to the development of the Mekong basin." See Mekong Committee, Report of
the Seventh Session of the Committee, Doc. E/CN. I I/WRD/M KG/R.23. (January 23, 1960)
pp. 28- 29.
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trator of UNDP in the prescribed form with supporting data and docu-
ments.51 After the evaluation of the Administrator, the request should be
approved by the Governing Council of the UNDP to make it effective.
3. The territory on which the international projects, for example Pa
Mong mainstream project, would be built could be internationalized and
made a United Nations territorial enclave. This would require not only an
agreement by the territorial states concerned but also by the United Na-
tions General Assembly. In this case, the territory would be under the
jurisdiction of the United Nations, and a host of legal problems might arise
as to the application of administrative regime over that area. The question
as to the authority of the organization to undertake the project works may
also have to be considered and approved by Member States of the United
Nations.
4. The United Nations might lease the territory on which the projects
would be constructed and re-lease the territory to the Mekong Devel-
opment Authority.52 The territorial states or state might conclude a lease
agreement with the United Nations, in which provisions might be made for
re-leasing the territory by the lessee. Such a proposal, on request from the
states concerned, might be considered by the appropriate organs of the
United Nations. This may be a simpler procedure compared to (3) above.
5. The United Nations might be represented in the Authority. Repre-
sentatives of the United Nations may be appointed in their personal ca-
pacity by the Secretary-General. This representation may be in the super-
visory and advisory capacity. Actual policy-making will be done by the
territorial states concerned.
6. It may also be possible, subject to the approval of the General
Assembly, to create a subsidiary body of the United Nations to act as the
Lower Mekong Development Authority pursuant to an agreement among
the territorial states. In this case, the decision of the General Assembly
would involve a determination of the Organization's authority to undertake
this function under the Charter.
While discussing the Pa Mong mainstream administration, Boonrod Bin-
son, the then Chairman and Member of the Mekong Committee for Thai-
land, observed that it was "eminently desirable to maintain, and strengthen,
the links between the Committee and the United Nations, which have been
5 1See United Nations Special Fund, Memorandum: The Form and Content of a Request
to the Special Fund, Doc. SF/4 (January 1I, 1960).52See Boonrod Binson, Systems of Administration of International Waters. Paper
presented at the Meeting of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Legal and Institutional
Implications of International Water Resources Development, Vienna (December 1968) dit-
toed.
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a dominant feature of the birth and life of Mekong Project."53 We should
not be naive enough to suppose that there is any magic in the phrase
"United Nations link."
The United Nations cannot find a panacea for all the deficiencies or
conflicts which might arise during the development of water resources.
Nevertheless, the role that the United Nations can play may be decisive,
and may influence to a great extent the easing of international tensions to
promote the cause of development by functioning as a catalytic agent. The
Indus Waters Treaty is a case in point.
The United Nations may be able to build up stability and cooperation
among the basin states. This is needed not only to permit an ordered
reliance on the availability of water resources but also to attract the
financial investment needed to exploit it. The United Nations may help to
break down mutual suspicion and distrust, thus making recourse to both
law and diplomacy easier and more fruitful. In brief, it breeds institutional
confidence.
By persuasive methods and the guidelines provided through legal stan-
dards, the United Nations may create the kind of confidence which neither
law nor diplomacy alone can engender. It may reduce the nationalistic
tendency which is conspicuous in ordinary negotiations. At both planning
and operating levels, the basin states' representatives should not be
allowed to become infatuated with their own blueprints. A third party
scrutiny and professional criticism can be a healthy factor in harmonizing
conflicts of views among the basin states and in achieving the specialization
necessary for effective action.
Concluding Observations
The Lower Mekong River Basin provides one of the most vivid illustra-
tions of the vital role that mutual cooperation can play in the development
of international water resources. The establishment of the Mekong Com-
mittee was a brilliant and imaginative act on the part of ECAFE. It not
only led to regional cooperation in which the riparian states have joined
together to develop the basin, but also inspired eight other countries in
Asia and eighteen elsewhere to offer aid, help and technical assistance.
Substantial progress has already been achieved in the programme relat-
ing to comprehensive investigation of the resources and basin planning,
54
and one can reasonably hope that the entire scheme of development of
531d., at 24.54For detailed accomplishments see The Mekong Committee, Annual Report 1970, Doc.
E/CN.l 11/955 (1970).
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navigation, hydro-electric power, irrigation, minerals, forestry, fisheries and
flood control will be carried through over the next few decades.
Although the Mekong Committee has made considerable strides in har-
nessing the river, it has not reached the mature status of the two historic
river authorities in Europe or the two in North America. In theory as well
as in practice the Lower Mekong basin states have recognized the impor-
tance of community interest in the development of the river resources they
commonly share. However, they have been reluctant to create a powerful
autonomous institution-even though created by themselves-with full le-
gal and administrative responsibility for multi-national development of
projects.
Stated otherwise, the basin states have jealously preserved their national
sovereignty by reserving for themselves final decision-making power on all
important matters. This may be attributed to two main reasons: first,
large-scale water resources development is a novel experiment for the
newly independent states in Southeast Asia; second, water is a depletable
and a multi-use resource, the proper control of which has a great impact on
social and economic development.
The establishment of agencies for development of international water
resources is not an entirely new phenomenon. Most of these experiments
have however been in the developed countries. In those countries, on
account of their accumulated rich experiences, refinements of science and
technology, and the availability of financial and human resources, national
and local agencies have been heavily relied on for the development activi-
ties. The necessity for a binational or multi-national agency is found min-
imal. What is needed is only a coordination of activities. Nevertheless,
joint agencies have been established to gather together and evaluate the
wide spectrum of social and economical impact, in order to ensure the
optimum and prudent utilization of the scarce resources.
In the Lower Mekong region where experienced national agencies are
non-existing or have had little experience, the necessity for a new organ-
izational arrangement with legal and administrative responsibility becomes
even more evident. The basin states suffer from a shortage of trained and
specialized personnel. 55 The financial commitment is far beyond their capa-
5 5The percentage of literacy, let alone scientific and technological knowledge, is very low
in the Lower Mekong basin states. In Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam literacy is around 20 per-
cent, while in Thailand the percentage is about fifty. In regard to vocational education and
training, Thailand and Vietnam may have facilities, while in the other two countries vocational
training facilities are inadequate to satisfy their needs for manpower in the professional,
technical and skilled categories. See International Labour Organization, Report to the Com-
mittee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin on Manpower related
to the Development of the Basin, Doc. ILO/TAP/AFE/R. 10 (Geneva: 1960).
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bility.5 6 Also, no development of importance has hitherto taken place in the
basin. These factors, however, do not prevent the establishment of an
International Authority to carry out the operational activities.
On the other hand, they provide excellent reasons for the creation of a
cross-basin agency for the unified and comprehensive development of the
basin. The gradual realization of the advantage of such an Authority, the
urge of cooperation, and the linking of the Mekong Committee together
with the United Nations and specialized agencies may pave the way for
such a unified control administration. A suitably structured and function-
oriented collective agency may help to eliminate political considerations
and to adapt an cooperative approach where emphasis is placed on partner-
ship and not on competition.
5 Struggling in the backwater of their marginal subsistence economies (per capita income
varies from 56 dollars in Laos, to 104 in Cambodia) the Lower Mekong countries could not
conceivably contribute anything substantial from their indigenous resources for the gigantic
Mekong development programmes. They cannot even hope to produce all the raw materials
and equipment for the development: most of these have to be imported.
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